Labor-Market Dropouts and the Racial Wage Gap: 1944)-'1990
Writing almost a quarter century ago, Richard Butler and James Heclunan (1977) cautioned social scientists to look beyond the dynamics of the racial wage gap for full-time workers, and to study the richer set of behaviors observed at the extensive margin of employment. They argued that, as the employment rate for blacks declined, primarily because of expansions in the generosity of transfer programs, observed relative wages increased because of the selective withdrawal of the least-skilled blacks from the labor force. At the time of writing their paper, Butler and Heckman could not have anticipated the phenomenal increase in the returns to skill that would occur in the 1980's. Therefore, in addition to expanding transfer programs, it is also possible that falling skill prices for the least skilled have reinforced the incentives to withdraw from the labor force. For both reasons, a preoccupation with the wages of full-time workers may cause social scientists to overstate the success of Title VII Legislation, or spuriously conclude that discrimination against blacks has declined.
In one of the first tests of this thesis, Charles Brown (1984) adjusted aggregate Current Population Survey (CPS) data to obtain estimates of the racial wage gap that reflected nonemployment by race. He found that, even though the published earnings ratios converged from 0.59 in 1953 to 0.71 in 1978, the corrected ratios moved from 0.57 to only 0.61 over the same period. Under the identifying restriction that nonworkers earn below what the median agent earns. Brown's results attribute two-thirds of the observed convergence to the selective withdrawal of blacks from the labor force (the ob-served gain of 20 percent is only 7 percent when the nonemployed are accounted for). Despite the magnitude of Brown's findings, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (1986) remains extremely cautious of accepting the relevance of the selective-withdrawal hypothesis. In the same spirit, much of the subsequent ]literature on the racial wage gap has continued to analyze the convergence of the wage gap for workers. or even more restrictively, for full-time workers. Most recently, Chinhui Juhn (1997) finds that the selective withdrawal of blacks reduces the observed convergence by one-third over 1968 -1988 , whereas Bruce Western and Becky Pettit (1999 attribute half of the observed convergence to this hypothesis for the [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] period. This paper uses data from the U.S. Decennial Census from and summarizes the results of a larger inquiry into the empirical content of the selective-withdrawal hypothesis (see Chandra [2000] for further details). The use of 50 years of data allows me to subsume all the time-periods examined by previour, studies, hence allowing me to compare my estimates to those obtained by the literature. As part of my analysis, I demonstrate the: importa~lce of not relying on inferences made on the racial wage gap from CPS data. The CPS has the advantage of producing a fairly consistent yearly timeseries from 1964 onward; however, it does not sample members of the anned forces and contains no information on the incarcerated population. These omissions bias empirical estimates of the racial wage gap. The former causes the researcher to overstate the racial wage gap because it ignores the significant role of employment in the armed forces in compressing the racial wage gap. This point has been noticed and documented in the sociology literature by Robert Mare and Christopher Winship (1984) who also provide evidence that the most able blacks are in the military. Aggreeate data separated by race are available from the Burcau of Labor Statistics fkom 1972 onward. According to thcsc data, black women aged 25-55 increased their employment to population ratios from 0.459 in 1972 to 0.612 in 1998. Over the same period, the conesponding numbers for white women went from 0.406 to 0.577. Based on these numhers, the selective-withdrawal hypothesis appears to be nonexistcut for wornen.
'Other sample restrictions include the requirement that no respondent should have imputed values for race, age, education, weeks worked. or wage anti salary earnings. In addition, the weekly wage distributions (by year and race) were trimmed at I percent and 99 percent to guard against outliers. This approach circun~vents the problem of imposing a real-dollar cutoff on thc wage distributions. the 1940's and 1950's are typically excluded in analyses that are based on CPS microeconomic data but deserve the further attention of labor economists and economic historians. Running parallel to these trends in relative weekly earnings is the corresponding decline in the employment rates of black men relative to whites. Together, these two series provide preliminary evidence in favor of the selective-withdrawal hypothesis. Whereas observed wage ratios have improved, the data also indicate that a growing fraction of men are not working.
In Table 1 , I examine the current labor-force employment status for prime-aged men.3 First, notice the decline in black self-employment over time.4 ~l s o note the growing share of black men "hese tables extend the work of Finis Welch (1990), Welch does not describe the sample restrictions imposed in his paper; therefore, his results are not st~ictly comparable to mine. My sample restrictions are described in this paper, and their implications are studied in the source paper (see Chandra 2000) .
"n their analysis of the self-employment behavior of white and black men, Robert Fairlie and Bnlce Meyer (1999) include all men ages 16-64. They restrict their sample to include nonagricultural workers, who worked 40 or more weeks in the preceding year and 35 or more hours in the preceding week. I am examining workers aged 25-55 with no restrictions on indusby worked or on labor supply. in the armed forces, as well as the fraction that are in the "not in the labor force" (NILF) category. The institutionalized fraction (which includes those who are incarcerated) has been growing over time. This group of individuals is excluded from any analysis that relies on CPS data by construction. In Table 2 . 1 interact the empioymentstatus variables with broad measures of education attainment and present results for 1940 and 1990 by race. From, these tables it is possible to see that
In the earlier years my classification of fanners as being self-employed raises estimates of the self-employment rate. This effect aside, in all years my estimates of the selfemployment rate will be lower than Fairlie and Meyer's because I am looking at the self-employed's share of the population, and not of all workers. To assess the empirical conteal of t11e selective-witlmdrawal hypothesis in more detail, in Table 3 1 use three alte~nativc methods LO predict the mean of the uaohserved distribuciorr of offer wages. For each year of data, 1report. rhe observed average weekly earnings i-'or whites and blacks."his row is followed by the results from the ""Brown" estixnator that repro. duces thc approach of B~O~I I (i984j. It generates tilt-: rnaxirnmn possible value ibr the racial wage gap bccal-1st: it makes the identifying as. su;mption that monworkers arc drawn from below the median of the offer-wage drstrib~tion. According to this estimator, even though ilie observed convcrgerrce in the average ratio h-om 1958 to 1990 was 13 perceniage points, rbe "true" convergence was only approximately 3 percentage poirrls. As a validity check: the resillts for provide estimate~ that arc found to be generally consisici~t with Bro~vn' s original analysis that covered the 1953-1978 period using CPS data. In interpreting Brown's results, remember that the i~mstibutionatized poprvtation is excladed from his analysis. 'The "cell minimum" estimator is motivated by Charles Manski (1995) and proceeds by sattlratillg the data by seven schooling groups and six age 'An additional sample restriction is imposed fbr this exercise. It may not he correct to treat weeldy self-employment earnings or weekly earnings for those in the armed forces as providing a measure of skill prices for these two groups. The former includes a return to physical and financial capital, and the latter. group receives a large fraction 01' compensation in the form of in-kind compensation. Therefore, based on current employment status, both groups were dropped for this portion of the analysis.
' /il(1984) assu~nption that ali non~vorkcss are drawn from below the median oi' tlit unconditional offer-wage distribution. The cell-minimu~~r crtirriator arrigns the rniiiinium valuc of observed earnings i iẽach (age X .;chovling) group to all nonworkers in !ha{ ccll, aiid the ccli-mean rciatching estimator assigns the ci:li mr:aii LO all rioi~wiirirer~. 1\11 doliar iigules hzve bcen de--flafcd ro i997 dol!ars nsing the irripiicii GDP price dellator, and the data arc weighted using person weights.
groups, and the11 matchilag all nonworkers in a given (age X edi~cation) cell to the lowest mmer n a tlitt~. cell. Finally, the more traditional matching estimator operationalizes the framework of Juhn (1997) arid assigns the mean cell wage LO all xionworkers in that celL6 'The power of' matching cstirnators is that they do not iol-.
"My approach is similar ro Juhn (1997), bur not ideniical. Juhn treats all ivorkers who worked 1-13 weeks as being nonworkers and imputes wages for this group, as wcli as for rcspondcnts who worked zero weeks in rhe previou.: year, by matchilip them to similar workers who workr:d I!$-26 wechs in the previous year.
pose an arbitary functional form on the data, and their estimates are readily intespretable. However, each must assume the logic of ignorable selection once age and schooling are conditioned on. As such they ignore the fact that, given agents with identical observables, some chose to work whereas others did not. This limitation of matching estimators is explored further by Chandra (2000) where the selective withdrawal hypothesis is examined by using semi-parametric estimation techniques.
The results of Table 3 provide evidence that supports the selective-withdrawal hypothesis. The table provides estimates of average weekly earnings as computed by the different estimators. The last column provides estimates of the relativeearnings ratio once the nonemployed are accounted for. As is to be expected. the Brown estimator results in the most substantial correction to the observed ratios. The matching estimator that relies on using cell-minima as estimates of the earnings of the nonemployed provides estimates that are between those obtained from the Brown estimator and the cell-mean-based matching estimator. A more complete analysis would disaggregate the analysis by skill-group to assess the differential impact of the selective-withdrawal hypothesis across skill groups. Regardless of the estimator chosen to "correct" for nonemployment, it is evident that during the 1960's black males made substantial gains relative to their wkrte counterparts. This analysis is therefore consistent with the conclusion that the Civil Rights legislation played an important role in improving the labor-market outcomes of black men. More generally however, the results of Table 3 should caution social scientists who focus only on observed wages to consider the impoitance of studying the joint determination of wages and employment.
IIX. Discussion
In this paper I have focused on the ratio of black weekly earnings to white weekly earnings as being the parameter of interest in stuciying the racial wage gap. This approach provides a succinct method for summariaing trends in the racial wage gap over time. However, in the presence of skill-biased technological change which "stretches" the skill distribution, it is possible that the relative positio~l of black men on the aggregate wage distribution has not changed, even though thc convergence in obcerved or corrected mean weekly earnings has stagnated or even deteriorated. This point constitutes the central thesis of Juhn et al. (1991) and provides an important avenue for future research in this area.
In the source paper (Chandra, 2000) 1 follow the framework developed in Juhn (1992) to disentangle the role of falling offer wages versus rising reservation wages in contril-uting to black nonemployment. I find that, since 1980. black males are not working because of declining skill prices. For this period, I do not find evidence for the hypothesis that rising reservation wages are causing black males to withdraw from the labor force. When this finding is combined with the results of Derek Neal and William Johnson (1996) , the role of public policies that affect relative wages becomes clearer. Because less-skilled black men are not working due to low offer wages, such interventions should be made early in life and shoul(1 be directed at closing the skill gap that exists between blacks and whites, before they enter the labor market.
